The normative web : an argument for moral realism

Terence Cuneo

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.

「Nielsen BookData」より

[目次]

  • Introduction
  • 1. Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort
  • 2. Defending the Parallel
  • 3. The Parity Premise
  • 4. Epistemic Nihilism
  • 5. Epistemic Expressivism: Traditional Views
  • 6. Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views
  • 7. Epistemic Reductionism
  • 8. Three Objections to the Core Argument
  • Bibliography

「Nielsen BookData」より

この本の情報

書名 The normative web : an argument for moral realism
著作者等 Cuneo Terence
出版元 Oxford University Press
刊行年月 2007
ページ数 263 p.
大きさ 24 cm
ISBN 9780199218837
NCID BA83457142
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
この本を: 
このエントリーをはてなブックマークに追加

このページを印刷

外部サイトで検索

この本と繋がる本を検索

ウィキペディアから連想