Approval voting

Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn

This book presents a simple and logical potential electoral reform. Under this system, voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate, its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and a probable increase in voter turnout.

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[目次]

  • Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution.- Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?.- The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?.- The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules.- Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?.- Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data.- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections.- Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions.- Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election.- Epilogue.

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この本の情報

書名 Approval voting
著作者等 Brams, Steven J.
Fishburn, Peter C.
出版元 Springer
刊行年月 c2007
版表示 2nd ed
ページ数 xxi, 198 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 9780387498959
NCID BA81612834
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 アメリカ合衆国
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