The principal agent model : the economic theory of incentives

edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont

Incentive theory has been a major development in economics and the principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement and rationality. Part one covers the foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part two deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part three. Part four presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems.

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この本の情報

書名 The principal agent model : the economic theory of incentives
著作者等 Laffont, Jean-Jacques
シリーズ名 An Elgar reference collection
The international library of critical writings in economics
出版元 E. Elgar
刊行年月 c2003
版表示 illustrated ed
ページ数 xxi, 683 p.
大きさ 25 cm
ISBN 1843762404
NCID BA63669749
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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