This volume challenges the dominant intellectual assumptions of mainstream international law scholarship regarding the principle of Sovereign Equality. The animus and scope of this challenge is situated in the context of the decision-making processes in International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) which employ the "one state, one vote" and/or the "weighted voting" rule. Using the theories of Functionalism and Legitimacy to analyze the legal implications and complications of the principal voting mechanisms and voting practices of certain key IGOs vis-a-vis the doctrine of Sovereign Equality, the author establishes that this doctrine has remained far too orthodox for contemporary realities. In this context, she emphasizes the importance of the necessity for functional legitimate decision-making processes in global governance, and, accordingly, advocates the elimination of the anachronistic and non-viable principle of Sovereign Equality from international institutional law. The author also rejects the introduction of any new principle in IGOs - for example democratic governance - which will render decision-making even less functional.