This three-volume set brings together 100 important papers published between 1960 to 1997 on the economic analysis of corruption and illegal markets. Highlighting the consequences of corruption both for the efficiency of a market system and on the long run growth of the economy, it ranges from theoretical issues explaining the nature of corruption to analogies between governments regulating legal markets and organized crime ruling over illegal markets. Particular attention is paid to the effects of standard public policies, such as standard controls or quality standards, on the development of shadow and illegal markets, and consequently on the incentives to invest in bribery and extortion. Volume I covers corruption and allocation of resources; corruption and game theory; corruption, bureaucracy, and public intervention; the social costs of corruption; and corruption, development, and growth. Volume II discusses productive and destructive economic activities, the economic theory of illegal activities, law enforcement and deterrence policies, and deterrence policies against corruption. Volume III addresses the underground economy, victimless activities and illegal markets, the economics of organized crime, and the market for drugs and public policy.