Game theory and economic behaviour : selected essays  v. 1 ~ v. 2

Reinhard Selten

In 1994 the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selton, John Nash and John Harsanyi for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selton refined the Nash equilibrium concept of non-co-operative games for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction and applied these concepts to analyses of oligopoly. This two-volume selection of Selton's work provides a comprehensive overview of his contribution to game theory and economic behaviour. Topics covered include: axiomatic characterizations; learning; political and social interaction; theories of oligopolistic competition; oligopoly experiments; and bilateral and coalition bargaining.

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[目次]

  • Part 1: in search of a better understanding of economic behaviour. Part 2 Axiomatic characterizations: valuation of n-person gas
  • properties of a measure of predictive success
  • an axiomatic approach to consumers' welfare
  • an axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives. Part 3 Learning: evolution, learning, and economic behaviour
  • anticipatory learning in two-person games
  • end behaviour in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames
  • experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions. Part 4 Political and social interaction: the scenario bundle method
  • balance of power in a parlour game
  • the distribution of foreign language skills as a game equilibrium. Part 5 Theories of oligopolistic competition: multistage game models and delay supergames
  • restabilizing responses, inertia supergames and oligopolistic equilibria
  • oligopolistic economies as games of limited information
  • elementary theory of slack-ridden imperfect competition. Part 6 Oligopoly experiments: an experiment in oligopoly
  • duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players. Part 7 Bilateral bargaining: game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model
  • equilibrium point selection in a bargaining situation with opportunity costs
  • original or fake - a bargaining game with incomplete information
  • bargaining experiments with incomplete information. Part 8 Coalition bargaining: equity and coalition bargaining in experimental three-person games
  • a demand commitment model of coalition bargaining
  • demand commitment bargaining in three-person quota game experiments.

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この本の情報

書名 Game theory and economic behaviour : selected essays
著作者等 Selten, Reinhard
巻冊次 v. 1
v. 2
出版元 E. Elgar
刊行年月 c1999
ページ数 2 v.
大きさ 25 cm
ISBN 1858988721
NCID BA41047632
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言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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