Decision theory as philosophy

Mark Kaplan

Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise.

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[目次]

  • 1. Confidence
  • 2. Evidence
  • 3. The Bayesian challenge
  • 4. Rational belief
  • 5. The Bayesian Canon
  • 6. Decision theory as epistemology.

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この本の情報

書名 Decision theory as philosophy
著作者等 Kaplan, Mark
出版元 Cambridge University Press
刊行年月 1998, c1996
ページ数 xv, 227 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 0521624967
0521475058
NCID BA36093856
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言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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