Competition policy : a game-theoretic perspective

Louis Phlips

This book uses game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Part I focuses on 'explicit collusion': the author proves that 'four are few and six are many', and shows how cartels can be enforced under imperfect and incomplete information. Part II on 'tacit collusion' discusses the informational requirements of collusion detection in noncooperative repeated games. In Part III on 'semicollusion', excess capacity is shown to reinforce collusion. Part IV is devoted to the detection of predatory pricing. In this book, Louis Phlips applies the latest economic theory to a discussion of several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies. The presentation of case studies, combined with a clear exposition of the theory, will make this book invaluable to teachers and students of competition policy.

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[目次]

  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. Preliminaries
  • Part I. Explicit Collusion: 2. Four are few and six are many
  • 3. Cartel laws are good for business
  • 4. Cartel enforcement
  • Part II. Tacit Collusion: 5. Information sharing among oligopolists
  • 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes
  • 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism
  • 8. Collusion detection
  • Part III. Semicollusion: 9. Excess capacity and collusion
  • 10. Collusion in R & D
  • Part IV. Predatory Pricing: 11. Predation in theory
  • 12. Evidence on predation
  • 13. Antitrust implications.

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この本の情報

書名 Competition policy : a game-theoretic perspective
著作者等 Phlips, Louis
出版元 Cambridge University Press
刊行年月 1995
ページ数 xvi, 272 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 0521498716
0521495210
NCID BA2603646X
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 アメリカ合衆国
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