Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action and akrasia

T.D.J. Chappell

Aristotle and Augustine both hold that our beliefs in freedom and voluntary action are interdependent, and that voluntary actions can only be done for the sake of good. Hence Aristotle holds that no-one acts voluntarily in pursuit of evil; such actions would be inexplicable. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they occur. This is the true place in Augustine's view of his "theory of will", and the real point of contrast between Aristotle and Augustine. In this text, the author takes up the suggestion made by J.L. Austin that the way to understand "free will", and Aristotle's discussion of freedom, is by seeking an understanding of what voluntary action is. This book makes the claim: that there are three conditions for voluntary action (namely, freedom from compulsion, from ignorance, and from irrationality) not two, as is usually held (namely, freedom from compulsion and from ignorance). The book also examines Aristotle's discussion of akrasia and reconsiders the contrast between Augustine and Aristotle, as well as focusing on Augustine as a philosopher of action.

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[目次]

  • Preface - PART 1: ARISTOTLE - The Limits of the Voluntary - Freedom, Ability and Knowledge - Proairesis and Practical Reasoning - The Varieties of Akrasia - PART 2: AUGUSTINE - Voluntariness and Responsibility in Augustine - Voluntas and the Voluntary - The Good Will and the Good Life - Bad Will and the Mystery of Evil - List of Works Cited - Index

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この本の情報

書名 Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action and akrasia
著作者等 Chappell, T. D. J.
Chappell Timothy
出版元 Macmillan;St. Martin's Press
刊行年月 1995
ページ数 xii, 213 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 0312124678
0333625374
NCID BA24858774
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言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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