An essay on belief and acceptance

L. Jonathan Cohen

In this incisive new monograph one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

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[目次]

  • What is the difference?
  • Purposive explanation
  • What cognitive state does indicative speech express?
  • Does knowledge imply belief or acceptance?
  • Self-deceit and the Socratic paradox

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この本の情報

書名 An essay on belief and acceptance
著作者等 Cohen, L. Jonathan
Cohen L.Jonathan
出版元 Clarendon Press;Oxford University Press
刊行年月 1992
ページ数 x, 163 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 0198242948
NCID BA18819563
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言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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