In the more recent literature on the logical structure of Leibniz' metaphysics, those theses predominate which see the metaphysics as being derived from his logic with an equivalence of logic and metaphysics and with the metaphysics being purely hypothetical. Andreas Blank develops alternatives to these views of Leibniz' metaphysics. His enquiry centres on the "descriptive" aspects (in Strawson's sense) of Leibniz' metaphysics, on the one hand on the epistemological aspects of his theory of metaphysical concepts, on the other on the application to the analysis of the material world of the metaphysical concepts gained from the description of the structures of thought. With Leibniz, the establishment of metaphysics from "top" to "bottom" is joined by one from "bottom" to "top". Central parts of Leibniz' logic can also be seen as consequences of a metaphysics established in this way.