Presidents, parliaments, and policy

edited by Stephan Haggard, Mathew D. McCubbins

Advocates of parliamentary rule have been highly critical of presidentialism for dividing powers and providing the opportunity for gridlock between branches. Fixed executive terms can saddle publics with ineffectual leaders who are not easily removed. Yet the great theorists of presidential rule, beginning with the Federalists, saw very different qualities in the same institutions: a desirable combination of strong leadership with checks on executive discretion. These diverse assessments arise because we have surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. The introductory essays in this volume, first published in 2001, lay the theoretical groundwork for such comparative analysis. Drawing on detailed cases of economic policymaking in Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, this book shows the diversity of presidential systems and isolates the effects of presidentialism from other factors that influence public policy, such as party systems. In doing so, it casts doubt on the critics of presidential rule and underscores the continuing vitality of this particular form of democratic rule.

「Nielsen BookData」より

Advocates of parliamentary rule have been highly critical of presidentialism for dividing powers and providing the opportunity for gridlock between branches. Fixed executive terms can saddle publics with ineffectual leaders who are not easily removed. Yet the great theorists of presidential rule, beginning with the Federalists, saw very different qualities in the same institutions: a desirable combination of strong leadership with checks on executive discretion. These diverse assessments arise because we have surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. The introductory essays in this volume, first published in 2001, lay the theoretical groundwork for such comparative analysis. Drawing on detailed cases of economic policymaking in Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, this book shows the diversity of presidential systems and isolates the effects of presidentialism from other factors that influence public policy, such as party systems. In doing so, it casts doubt on the critics of presidential rule and underscores the continuing vitality of this particular form of democratic rule.

「Nielsen BookData」より

[目次]

  • 1. Introduction: political institutions and the determinants of public policy Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • Part I. Theory: 2. The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • 3. Institutions and public policy in presidential systems Matthew S. Shugart and Stephan Haggard
  • Part II. Budgetary Policy Cases: 4. Budget procedure and fiscal restraint in post-transition Chile Lisa Baldez and John M. Carey
  • 5. Political institutions and public policy in Argentina: an overview of the formation and execution of the National Budget Mark P. Jones
  • 6. Democracy and deficits in Taiwan: the politics of fiscal policy, 1986-96 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard
  • Part III. Regulatory Policy Cases: 7. Political institutions and economic development: the case of electric utility regulation in Argentina and Chile William B. Heller and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • 8. Power politics: elections and electricity regulation in Taiwan Stephan Haggard and Gregory W. Noble
  • 9. Privatization in transition economies: politics as usual? Philip Keefer and Mary Shirley
  • 10. Conclusion: policymaking in presidential systems Stephan Haggard, Mathew D. McCubbins and Matthew Shugart.

「Nielsen BookData」より

[目次]

  • 1. Introduction: political institutions and the determinants of public policy Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • Part I. Theory: 2. The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • 3. Institutions and public policy in presidential systems Matthew S. Shugart and Stephan Haggard
  • Part II. Budgetary Policy Cases: 4. Budget procedure and fiscal restraint in post-transition Chile Lisa Baldez and John M. Carey
  • 5. Political institutions and public policy in Argentina: an overview of the formation and execution of the National Budget Mark P. Jones
  • 6. Democracy and deficits in Taiwan: the politics of fiscal policy, 1986-96 Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard
  • Part III. Regulatory Policy Cases: 7. Political institutions and economic development: the case of electric utility regulation in Argentina and Chile William B. Heller and Mathew D. McCubbins
  • 8. Power politics: elections and electricity regulation in Taiwan Stephan Haggard and Gregory W. Noble
  • 9. Privatization in transition economies: politics as usual? Philip Keefer and Mary Shirley
  • 10. Conclusion: policymaking in presidential systems Stephan Haggard, Mathew D. McCubbins and Matthew Shugart.

「Nielsen BookData」より

この本の情報

書名 Presidents, parliaments, and policy
著作者等 Haggard, Stephan
McCubbins, Mathew D.
Calvert Randall
Eggertsson Thrainn
McCubbins Mathew D.
Haggard Stephen
シリーズ名 Political economy of institutions and decisions
出版元 Cambridge University Press
刊行年月 2001
ページ数 xv, 359 p.
大きさ 24 cm
ISBN 0521774853
0521773040
NCID BA50765772
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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