Economic games, bargaining and solutions

edited by Omar F. Hamouda and J.C.R. Rowley

This is the third volume in a ten-volume set designed for publication in 1997. It reprints in book form a selection of the most important and influential articles on probability, econometrics and economic games which cumulatively have had a major impact on the development of modern economics. There are 242 articles, dating from 1936 to 1996. Many of them were originally published in relatively inaccessible journals and may not, therefore, be available in the archives of many university libraries. The volumes are available separately and also as a complete ten-volume set. The contributors include D. Ellsberg, R.M. Hogart, J.B. Kadane, B.O. Koopmans, E.L. Lehman, D.F. Nicholls, H. Rubin, T.J. Sarjent, L.H. Summers and C.R. Wymer. This particular volume deals with economic games and the functions of bargaining and solutions.

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[目次]

  • Part A - Bargaing and the emergence of games: economics and the theory of games - asurvey, Andrew Schotter
  • Game Theory and the history of ideas about rationality, Anne E. Cudd
  • modeling rational part I and modeling rational players part I, Ken Binmore. Part B- The core: Francis Ysidro Edgeworth - perfect competition and the core, Werner Hildenbrand
  • th usefulness of Core Theory in economics, Lester G. Telser
  • a limit theorum on the core of an economy, Gerard Debreu and Herbertt Scarf
  • the core of an N Person game, Herbert E. Scarf. Part C - Non-coperative Bargainig Theory - an introduction, John Sutton
  • recent advances in Olipololy Theory from a game theory perspective, Alistair Ulph. Part D - Empirical aspects of games: game theory as apart of empirical economics, Alvin E. Roth
  • games economists play - a non co-operative view, Franklin M. Fisher
  • bargaining experiments and explaining everything / explaining nothing? game theoretic models in industrial economics, John Sutton. part E - solution concepts and theories: solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selton Theory I - analysis of specific bargaining games and II - analysis of specific bargaining games, John C. Harsanyi
  • the Nash Bargaining Solution in economic modeling, Ken Binmore with Ariel Rubenstein and Asher Wolinsky
  • knowledge and equilibrium in games, Adam Brandenburger
  • what is game theory tring to accomplish?, Robert Aumann. Part F- Probability and other issues: subjective probability and the theory of games and the confusion of Is and Ought in game theoretic contexts, Joseph B. Kadane and Patrick D. Larkey, game theory is not a useful tool for the political scientist, Mario Bunge
  • are game theoretic concepts suitable negotiation support tools? from Nash Equilibrium refinements toward a cognative concept of rationality, Bertrand R. Munier and Jean Louis Rulliere.

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この本の情報

書名 Economic games, bargaining and solutions
著作者等 Hamouda, O. F.
Rowley, J. C. R.
シリーズ名 An Elgar reference collection
Foundations of probability, econometrics, and economic games
出版元 Edward Elgar
刊行年月 c1997
ページ数 xxi, 502 p.
大きさ 25 cm
ISBN 1858984351
NCID BA3131128X
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言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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