Robust mechanism design : the role of private information and higher order beliefs

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris ; [foreword by Eric S. Maskin]

This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

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[目次]

  • Mechanism Design
  • Game Theory
  • Auction Theory
  • Implementation
  • Private Information
  • First and Higher-Order Belief
  • Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
  • Ex Post Equilibrium
  • Rationalizability
  • Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
  • Private Value
  • Interdependent Value
  • Common Value
  • Belief-Free Mechanisms.

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この本の情報

書名 Robust mechanism design : the role of private information and higher order beliefs
著作者等 Maskin, Eric
Morris Stephen
Bergemann Dirk
シリーズ名 World scientific series in economic theory
出版元 World Scientific
刊行年月 c2012
ページ数 xvii, 452 p.
大きさ 24 cm
ISBN 9789814374583
NCID BB09080848
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 シンガポール
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