Legislative leviathan : party government in the House

Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

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The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

「Nielsen BookData」より

[目次]

  • Part I. The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees: 1. Self-selection and the subgovernment thesis
  • 2. The seniority system in Congress
  • 3. Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees: Part II. A Theory of Party Organization: 4. Institutions as solutions to collective dilemmas
  • 5. A theory of legislative parties
  • Part III. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions: 6. On the decline of party voting in Congress
  • Part IV. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments: 7. Party loyalty and committee assignments
  • 8. Contingents and parties
  • Part V. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power: 9. The majority party and the legislative agenda
  • 10. Controlling the legislative agenda.

「Nielsen BookData」より

[目次]

  • Part I. The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees: 1. Self-selection and the subgovernment thesis
  • 2. The seniority system in Congress
  • 3. Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees: Part II. A Theory of Party Organization: 4. Institutions as solutions to collective dilemmas
  • 5. A theory of legislative parties
  • Part III. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions: 6. On the decline of party voting in Congress
  • Part IV. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments: 7. Party loyalty and committee assignments
  • 8. Contingents and parties
  • Part V. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power: 9. The majority party and the legislative agenda
  • 10. Controlling the legislative agenda.

「Nielsen BookData」より

この本の情報

書名 Legislative leviathan : party government in the House
著作者等 Cox, Gary W.
McCubbins, Mathew D.
McCubbins Mathew D.
出版元 Cambridge University Press
刊行年月 2007
版表示 2nd ed
ページ数 xv, 309 p.
大きさ 23 cm
ISBN 9780521872331
9780521694094
NCID BA82431697
※クリックでCiNii Booksを表示
言語 英語
出版国 イギリス
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